
Di Afghanistan pun sebetulnya Pemerintah dan Tentara Afghanistan yg Sunni itu melawan pemberontak Mujahidin Taliban. Terjadi Bughot. Perang Saudara seperti di Suriah sekarang. Nah Uni Soviet masuk membantu. Ini seperti Rusia yg mengirimkan kapal perang untuk membantu Assad melawan pemberontak Suriah. AS membantu dengan dana dan senjata canggih seperti Stinger yang mampu merontokkan pesawat-pesawat tempur Uni Soviet. Akhirnya terjadi perang pemerintah Afghanistan+Uni Soviet melawan Mujahidin yang dibantu AS, Pakistan, Inggris, dan negara=negara Arab di thun 1979-1989. Tahun 1988 Osama bin Laden yang sebelumnya bergabung dengan Mujahidin membentuk kelompok Al Qaida.
Kerjasama AS dengan "Mujahidin" seperti Al Qaida (Wahabi) ternyata tak berhenti hanya di Afghanistan. Tapi berlanjut di Iraq, Libya, dan sekarang Suriah. Sekutu AS, Arab Saudi dan Qatar, membangun pesantren2 Wahabi guna mensuplai para "Mujahidin". Mereka ini nanti melakukan Bughot/pemberontakan di negara-negara yang anti AS seperti Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Suriah, dsb. Di Arab dan Qatar pemberontakan "Mujahidin" tidak terjadi bukan?
Foto di atas adalah foto Matthew van Dyke, seorang Kristen. Dia warga negara AS, Philadelphia, yang "berjuang" bersama pemberontak Libya dan sekarang "berjuang" di Suriah.
http://kabarislam.wordpress.com/2013/04/19/as-bantu-al-qaida-dengan-agen-mujahid-dan-senjata/
Ternyata Osama bin Laden adalah penghubung antara pemerintah AS, Pemberontak Afghanistan, dan Pemerintah Arab Saudi. Dibuat "Pesantren"2 kolot dengan paham takfir untuk membangkitkan semangat Jihad guna melawan Uni Soviet di Afghanistan dan Pakistan. Dari situ didapat pasukan jihad yang disebut "Taliban" dari santri2 Pesantren tsb.
Setelah Uni Soviet kalah, tak lama kemudian Uni Soviet hancur karena negara2 Islam seperti Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, dsb memerdekakan diri. Taliban saat berkuasa, ternyata begitu ekstrim sehingga tidak bisa merangkul semua kekuatan Islam.
Saat AS menyerbu pun akhirnya dapat dikalahkan dengan mudah. Perlawanan yang ada hanya menimbulkan teror dan kekacauan. Bukan kembali kepada kekuasaan untuk mengadakan pemerintahan yang teratur.
Kerjasama AS dengan Mujahidin di Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, dan sekarang Suriah ternyata gagal memunculkan Negara Islam. Yang ada justru kekacauan. Negara-negara tersebut jadi lemah.
Tuduhan Qaddafi bahwa Al Qaida terlibat pemberontakan di Libya: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011224143054988104.html
Gaddafi blames unrest on al-Qaeda
english.aljazeera.net
Libyan leader says protesters are young people being manipulated by al-Qaeda, as violence continues across the country.
Bush menuduh Saddam terlibat Al Qaida dan menyerang Iraq karena itu. Padahal AS lah yg selama ini bekerja dgn Al Qaida: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/sprj.irq.bush.iraq/
CNN.com - Bush: Iraq, al Qaeda linked - Jan. 30, 2003
edition.cnn.com
President Bush spent Wednesday trying to draw a link between a possible war in Iraq and the war against terrorism. He repeated accusations that Iraq is linked to the al Qaeda terrorist network.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50679-2004Jun17.html
Bush Defends Assertions of Iraq-Al Qaeda Relationship (washingtonpost.com)
www.washingtonpost.com
Pemberontak Al Qaida di Suriah bersatu dengan Al Qaida di Iraq:
Iraqi al-Qaeda and Syria militants announce merger
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/09/qaeda-iraq-syria-merger/2066333/
[caption id="attachment_2515" align="aligncenter" width="468"]

Referensi:
The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted nine years from December 1979 to February 1989. Part of the Cold War, it was fought between Soviet-led Afghan forces against multi-national insurgent groups called the Mujahideen. The insurgents received military training in neighboring Pakistanand China, as well as[8] billions of dollars from the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.[2][3][4][8][23] The decade-long war resulted in millions of Afghans fleeing their country, mostly to Pakistanand Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Afghan civilians were killed in addition to the participants in the war.
The initial Soviet deployment of the 40th Army in Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979, under Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[24] The final troop withdrawalstarted on May 15, 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989, under the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Due to the interminable nature of the war, the conflict in Afghanistan has sometimes been referred to as the "Soviet Union'sVietnam War" or the "Bear Trap".[25][26][27]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan
War in Afghanistan
US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Project: War in Afghanistan
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In 1973 Afghan Prince Muhammad Daoud ousts the Afghan king with help from the Soviet Union, and establishes an Afghan republic. The CIA in turn begins funding Islamist extremists, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as a resistance movement opposing the Soviets. US allies Iran, with its intelligence agency SAVAK, and Pakistan, with its intelligence agency the ISI, play an important role in funneling weapons and other forms of assistance to the Afghan Islamist militants. After the pro-Soviet coup in April 1978, the Islamic militants with the support of the ISI carry out a massive campaign of terrorism, assassinating hundreds of teachers and civil servants. [DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 260 - 263]
Entity Tags: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Organization for Intelligence and National Security (Iran), Muhammad Daoud, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

In 1977 Zbigniew Brzezinski, as President Carter’s National Security Adviser, forms the Nationalities Working Group (NWG) dedicated to the idea of weakening the Soviet Union by inflaming its ethnic tensions. The Islamic populations are regarded as prime targets. Richard Pipes, the father of Daniel Pipes, takes over the leadership of the NWG in 1981. Pipes predicts that with the right encouragement Soviet Muslims will “explode into genocidal fury” against Moscow. According to Richard Cottam, a former CIA official who advised the Carter administration at the time, after the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978, Brzezinski favored a “de facto alliance with the forces of Islamic resurgence, and with the Republic of Iran.” [DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 241, 251 - 256]
Entity Tags: Richard Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Nationalities Working Group
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, US International Relations, Neoconservative Influence
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
The CIA begins covert action against the Communist government in Afghanistan, which is closely tied to the Soviet Union. Some time this year, the CIA begins training militants in Pakistan and beaming radio propaganda into Afghanistan. By April 1979, US officials are meeting with opponents of the Afghan government to determine their needs. [BLUM, 1995, PP. 344] Robert Gates, who will become CIA Director in the early 1990s, will later recall that in a meeting on March 30, 1979, Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocumbe wonders aloud whether there is “value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, ‘sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.’” [GATES, 1996, PP. 145] In March 1979, there is a major revolt in Herat province, and in June and August there are large scale army mutinies.[COOLEY, 2002, PP. 5] President Carter will formally approve covert aid to opponents of the government in July (see July 3, 1979), which will result in a Russian invasion in December (see December 8, 1979).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. Gates, Walter Slocumbe
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: CIA Operations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan
In December 1978, President Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says, “An arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.” [TIME, 1/8/1979]There is widespread discontent and rioting in Iran at the time. State Department official Henry Precht will later recall that Brzezinski had the idea “that Islamic forces could be used against the Soviet Union. The theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and so an arc of Islam could be mobilized to contain the Soviets.” [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 67] In November 1978, President Carter appointed George Ball head of a special White House Iran task force under Brzezinski. Ball recommends the US should drop support for the Shah of Iran and support the radical Islamist opposition of Ayatollah Khomeini. This idea is based on ideas from British Islamic expert Dr. Bernard Lewis, who advocates the balkanization of the entire Muslim Near East along tribal and religious lines. The chaos would spread in what he also calls an “arc of crisis” and ultimately destabilize the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union. The Shah will later comment in exile, “I did not know it then, perhaps I did not want to know? But it is clear to me now that the Americans wanted me out. Clearly this is what the human rights advocates in the State Department wanted. What was I to make of the Administration’s sudden decision to call former Under Secretary of State George Ball to the White House as an adviser on Iran? Ball was among those Americans who wanted to abandon me and ultimately my country.” [ENGDAHL, 1992] While there is later debate about US policy towards Iran actually is at this time, it will be noted that the Carter administration had “no clear policy” due to internal divisions and confusion. [KEDDIE, 2003] The Shah abdicates on January 16, 1979, and Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile to Iran on February 1, 1979, taking over the government. Brzezinski will attempt to create a de facto alliance with Khomeini’s new fundamentalist government, but his efforts will come to a half with the Iranian hostage crisis in November 1979 (see February-November 4, 1979).
Entity Tags: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., George Ball, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bernard Lewis, Henry Precht, Seyyed Ruhollah Khomeini
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
As the US mobilizes for covert war in Afghanistan (see 1978 and July 3, 1979), a CIA special envoy meets Afghan mujaheddin leaders at Peshawar, Pakistan, near the border to Afghanistan. All of them have been carefully selected by the Pakistani ISI and do not represent a broad spectrum of the resistance movement. One of them is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a drug dealer with little support in Afghanistan, but who is loyal to the ISI. The US will begin working with Hekmatyar and over the next 10 years over half of all US aid to the mujaheddin will go to his faction (see 1983). Hekmatyar is already known as brutal, corrupt, and incompetent. [MCCOY, 2003, PP. 475] His extreme ruthlessness, for instance, his reputation for skinning prisoners alive, is considered a plus, as it is thought he will use that ruthlessness to kill Russians. [DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 267-268]
Entity Tags: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: CIA Operations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan
President Carter authorizes covert aid for opponents of the Communist government in Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, will state in 1998, “According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujaheddin began… after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan… But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.… We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.” [LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (PARIS), 1/15/1998] After Brzezinski’s confession, other US officials who denied US involvement prior to the Soviet invasion will change their story as well. For instance, Charles Cogan, who is head of the CIA covert aid program to Afghanistan at this time, will call Carter’s approval on this day a “very modest beginning to US involvement.” [COOLEY, 2002, PP. 10] In fact, even this is not correct because the CIA had been aiding the rebels since at least the year before (see1978 and 1973-1979). The Soviets invade Afghanistan by the end of 1979 (seeDecember 8, 1979).
Entity Tags: Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., Charles Cogan
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Some fighters opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan begin training in the US. According to journalist John Cooley, the training is done by Navy Seals and Green Beret officers who have taken draconian secrecy oaths. Key Pakistani officers are trained, as well as some senior Afghan mujaheddin. Much of the training takes place in Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia, which is said to be the CIA’s main location for training spies and assets. Other training takes place at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Harvey Point, North Carolina, and Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia. Subjects are trained in how to detect explosives, surveillance, how to recruit new agents, how to run paramilitary operations, and more. They are taught to use many different weapons as well, including remote-controlled mines and bombs, and sophisticated timers and explosives. Cooley claims that “apparently [no] Arab or other foreign volunteers” are trained in the US. [COOLEY, 2002, PP. 70-72] However, in the late 1980s, US consular official Michael Springmann will notice fighters from many Middle Eastern nations are getting US visas, apparently to train in the US for the Afghan war (see September 1987-March 1989). Additionally, more training takes place in other countries. For instance, Cooley will note, “By the end of 1980, US military trainers were sent to Egypt to impart the skills of the US Special Forces to those Egyptians who would, in turn, pass on the training to the Egyptian volunteers flying to the aid of the mujaheddin in Afghanistan.” Cooley will further note, “Time and time again, these same techniques reappear among the Islamist insurgents in Upper Egypt and Algeria, since the ‘Afghani’ Arab veterans began returning there in the late 1980s and early 1990s.” [COOLEY, 2002, PP. 70-72] It is not known how long these training programs continue.
Entity Tags: Green Berets, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Springmann, Navy Seals
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Fearing a diplomatic incident, CIA and other US agents rarely venture into Afghanistan. Generally speaking, soldiers from the British elite Special Air Service (SAS) work with and train the mujaheddin instead. The SAS provides weapons training in Afghanistan until 1982 when Russian soldiers find the passports of two British instructors in a training camp. After that, mujaheddin are trained in secret camps in remote parts of Scotland. When the US decides to supply Stinger missiles to the mujaheddin in 1986, it is the SAS who provide the training in how to use them (see September 1986). But the SAS is taking orders from the CIA. The CIA also indirectly gives weapons to Osama bin Laden and other mujaheddin leaders. One former US intelligence official will say in 1999, “[US agents] armed [bin Laden’s] men by letting him pay rock-bottom prices for basic weapons.” But this person notes the relationship will later prove to be embarrassing to bin Laden and the CIA. “Of course it’s not something they want to talk about.” [REEVE, 1999, PP. 168]
Entity Tags: Special Air Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: CIA Operations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see December 8, 1979), President Carter declares in his annual State of the Union address, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This will become known as the Carter Doctrine. [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 69, 303] The US immediately follows up with a massive build up of military forces in the region. New military arrangements are made with Kenya, Oman, Somalia, Egypt, and Pakistan. In March 1980, a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is created, which will be renamed US Central Command (or Centcom) several years later. [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 78-79, 308-309]
Entity Tags: James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., US Central Command
Timeline Tags: US Military, Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
In November 1982, US Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) travels to Islamabad, Pakistan, and meets with President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. He promises Zia to deliver a crucial weapons system that has so far been denied by the US—the latest radar systems for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter planes. Wilson also meets with CIA Station Chief Howard Hart, who is in charge of providing support for the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. He urges Hart to expand the program and stresses that vast amounts of money can be made available. [CRILE, 2003, PP. 106-129] The next month, President Zia comes to the US to meet with President Reagan. Zia first meets with Wilson in Houston and expresses his gratitude for helping Pakistan acquire F-16 radar systems (see November-December 1982). Wilson then broaches the subject of Pakistan secretly purchasing arms from Israel for the Afghan War. Zia agrees to this in principle. [CRILE, 2003, PP. 131-132]
Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan, Charlie Wilson, Howard Hart, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) travels to Israel where he meets with Zvi Rafiah and other Israeli officials. From Israel he travels to Egypt and then Pakistan, where he secretly negotiates a major weapons deal with Pakistan (seeNovember-December 1982) on behalf of the Israelis in support of the mujaheddin fighting Soviets in Afghanistan. Among other things, the deal includes the delivery of T-55 tanks. Author George Crile will later comment, “The Israelis were hoping this deal would serve as the beginning of a range of under-the-table understandings with Pakistan that the congressman would continue to quietly negotiate for them.” [CRILE, 2003, PP. 141]
Entity Tags: Charlie Wilson, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Pakistan-Afghan Relations

Entity Tags: Charlie Wilson, William Casey, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Turki al-Faisal
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Pakistan-Afghan Relations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
By 1984, huge amounts of arms and ammunition for the mujaheddin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan are pouring into Pakistan. These weapons are funded by the CIA and Saudi government, and generally come into the port of Karachi. The criminal BCCI bank has an enforcement arm nicknamed the “Black Network.” Time magazine reporters Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne will later describe it as “a Karachi-based cadre of bank operatives, paramilitary units, spies, and enforcers who handled BCCI’s darkest operations around the globe and trafficked in bribery and corruption.” By 1984, BCCI and its Black Network takes effective control of Karachi’s port, dominating Pakistan’s customs service there with bribery and intimidation. BCCI is thus in a position to dominate the flow of supplies to the mujaheddin. Pakistan’s military handles the flow of weapons from Karachi to the Afghan border, but once there the supplies have to be carried by mules to reach the mujaheddin fighting in remote Afghan mountain ranges. BCCI controls this part of the supply chain as well. Sometimes BCCI personnel simply transport the supplies across Afghanistan to Iran and then sell them there for a profit. [BEATY AND GWYNNE, 1993, PP. 66, 315-316] The US government is aware of BCCI’s support role and cooperates with it. For instance, in 1987 USAID asks BCCI to buy 1,000 more mules to help the mujaheddin. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/3/1991] At almost every step of the way, BCCI takes a cut of the profits and often steals some of the supplies.[BEATY AND GWYNNE, 1993, PP. 66, 315-316]
Entity Tags: Black Network, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Central Intelligence Agency, USAID
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: CIA Operations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Akhtar Abdur Rahman, William Casey,Mohammad Yousaf, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Entity Tags: Robert M. Gates, Charlie Wilson, Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Cogen, William Casey
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: CIA Operations, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), also known as Al-Kifah, is Osama bin Laden’s main charity front in the 1980s. The US government will later call it the “precursor organization to al-Qaeda” (see Late 1984). In 2005, investigative journalist Joe Trento will write, “CIA money was actually funneled to MAK, since it was recruiting young men to come join the jihad in Afghanistan.” Trento will explain this information comes from “a former CIA officer who actually filed these reports” but who cannot be identified because he still works in Afghanistan. MAK was founded in 1984 (see Late 1984) and was disbanded around 1996 (see Shortly After November 19, 1995). However, Trento will not specify exactly when CIA aid to MAK began or how long it lasted. [TRENTO, 2005, PP. 342] Bin Laden appears to have other at least indirect contact with the CIA around this time (see 1986).
Entity Tags: Joseph Trento, Maktab al-Khidamat, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
The arrest of a Pakistani agent attempting to buy components for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the US starts a crisis that could potentially lead to the cutting off of US aid to Pakistan, and an end to US support for the mujaheddin in the Soviet-Afghan War. When Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and an opponent of Pakistan, learns of the attempted purchase—of Kryton high-speed triggers that are used to fire nuclear weapons—he calls for hearings to look into the affair. The crisis passes, but it is unclear exactly how. Author George Crile will attribute the resolution to threats made to Solarz by Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX), a strong supporter of US involvement in the war: “Wilson understood that this was a battle that could not be won with debating points; reportedly, he went to Solarz armed with certain classified intelligence about India’s nuclear program. He is said to have suggested that India might be more exposed than Pakistan when it came to the issue of the bomb.” [CRILE, 2003, PP. 463-4]
Entity Tags: Charlie Wilson, Stephen Solarz, House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, George Crile
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Pakistan-Afghan Relations
The Central Intelligence Agency, which has been supporting indigenous Afghan groups fighting occupying Soviet forces, becomes unhappy with them due to infighting, and searches for alternative anti-Soviet allies. MSNBC will later comment: “[T]he CIA, concerned about the factionalism of Afghanistan made famous by Rudyard Kipling, found that Arab zealots who flocked to aid the Afghans were easier to ‘read’ than the rivalry-ridden natives. While the Arab volunteers might well prove troublesome later, the agency reasoned, they at least were one-dimensionally anti-Soviet for now. So [Osama] bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the ‘reliable’ partners of the CIA in its war against Moscow.” The CIA does not usually deal with the Afghan Arabs directly, but through an intermediary, Pakistan’s ISI, which helps the Arabs through the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) run by Abdullah Azzam. [MSNBC, 8/24/1998] The agreement is sealed during a secret visit to Pakistan, where CIA Director William Casey commits the agency to support the ISI program of recruiting radical Muslims for the Afghan war from other Muslim countries around the world. In addition to the Gulf States, these include Turkey, the Philippines, and China. The ISI started their recruitment of radicals from other countries in 1982 (see 1982). This CIA cooperation is part of a joint CIA-ISI plan begun the year before to expand the “Jihad” beyond Afghanistan (see 1984-March 1985). [RASHID, 2001, PP. 128-129] Thousands of militant Arabs are trained under this program (see1986-1992).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Maktab al-Khidamat, Abdullah Azzam, William Casey, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, CIA Operations

Entity Tags: Islamic Association for Palestine, Barnett Rubin, Abdullah Azzam, Clement Rodney Hampton-El, El Sayyid Nosair, Muslim World League, Nihad Awad, Muslim Arab Youth Association, Muslim Brotherhood, Council on American-Islamic Relations
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
In 1985, the CIA, MI6 (Britain’s intelligence agency), and the Pakistani ISI agree to launch guerrilla attacks from Afghanistan into then Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, attacking military installations, factories, and storage depots within Soviet territory. Some Afghans have been trained for this purpose since 1984 (see1984-March 1985). The task is given to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan warlord closely linked to the ISI. According to an account in the Washington Post, in March 1987, small units cross from bases in northern Afghanistan into Tajikistan and launched their first rocket attacks against villages there. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/1992;PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 9/23/2001] However, Mohammad Yousaf, a high-ranking ISI officer at the time, will later write a well regarded book about the Soviet-Afghan war and will give a different account. He will claim the attacks in the Soviet Union actually begin in 1985 and are much more numerous. He says, “These cross-border strikes were at their peak in 1986. Scores of attacks were made across the Amu (River)… Sometimes Soviet citizens joined in these operations, or came back into Afghanistan to join the mujaheddin… That we were hitting a sore spot was confirmed by the ferocity of the Soviets’ reaction. Virtually every incursion provoked massive aerial bombing and gunship attacks on all villages south of the river in the vicinity of our strike.” [DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 286] By all accounts, these secret attacks are strongly backed by CIA Director William Casey and come to an end when he dies later in 1987. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/19/1992; DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 285-286]
Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Central Intelligence Agency,Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, William Casey
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan
Salem bin Laden tells one of his employees, George Harrington, that his brother Osama, is, according to a later account by Harrington, “the liaison between the US, the Saudi government, and the Afghan rebels.” Salem, head of the bin Laden family, also says that he must visit Osama in Peshawar, a base inside Pakistan for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin, to check on what equipment the Saudi government is funneling to him. The two men fly up together with another employee, Bengt Johansson, and meet Osama that day. Osama also gives his brother and the two employees a tour of some facilities in Peshawar, including refugee camps, a hospital and an orphanage, and Salem films them to publicize his brother’s charitable work. [COLL, 2008, PP. 7-9]
Entity Tags: Salem bin Laden, Osama bin Laden, Bengt Johansson, George Harrington
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Ronald Reagan, William Casey
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
After the governments of Saudi Arabia and Britain sign the massive Al Yamamah arms deal, “unconventional aspects” of the deal mean that money can be diverted for a variety of purposes. The arms being purchased by Saudi Arabia are paid for not in cash, but in oil, with between four and six hundred thousand barrels a day being bartered to finance the weapons. This enables the Saudis to evade production caps put in place by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although most of the money realized from the oil should theoretically go to the British as payment for the arms, some of it apparently finds its way back to Saudi Arabians. It is then used to support a number of covert programs to arm anti-Communists supported by Saudi Arabia, such as the purchase of weapons in Egypt that are then sent to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. [COLL, 2008, PP. 289] It is possible that some of the money is used to finance a missile purchase by the bin Laden brothers for Arabs fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War (see Mid-1986).
Assistant Undersecretary of Defence Michael Pillsbury flies to the Afghan frontier to review training facilities used by two Afghan warlords, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Although Pillsbury is not involved in the day-to-day running of the Soviet-Afghan War, he chairs an interagency White House group that sets US policy on its support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. During the meetings, Pillsbury asks the two rebel commanders, both noted for their close relationship with Arab volunteers fighting in the war, about how effective the Arabs are and whether the US should allocate resources to them directly. However, both commanders reply that they do not want aid or supplies to be diverted to the Arabs, they want everything they can get for themselves. [COLL, 2008, PP. 286-287]Despite this, CIA Director William Casey comes to an agreement with the Pakistani ISI to boost Arab participation in the war (see 1985-1986), and a group of Arabs led by Osama bin Laden will establish a camp independent of the Afghan leaders later in the year (see Late 1986).
Entity Tags: Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Michael Pillsbury
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
1986-1993: CIA and Bin Laden Both Closely Tied to Recruiting and Fund-Raising Office for Afghanistan

Entity Tags: Jamal al-Fadl, Khaled Abu el-Dahab, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Mustafa Shalabi, Maktab al-Khidamat, Osama bin Laden, Fawaz Damra, El Sayyid Nosair, Mahmud Abouhalima, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Central Intelligence Agency,Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Al Farouq Mosque, Abdullah Azzam, Ali Shinawy, Ali Mohamed,Al-Kifah Refugee Center
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Richard W. Murphy, William Casey,Central Intelligence Agency, John Pilger, Benazir Bhutto
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Islamic Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin,Other Islamist Radical Groups
Bin Laden family head Salem bin Laden asks the Pentagon to supply anti-aircraft missiles to Arab volunteers fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War. The request is made on behalf of Salem’s brother Osama, who is establishing a semi-autonomous group of Arab volunteers outside the direct control of local Afghan commanders and will set up a camp just for Arabs later this year (see Late 1986). The Pentagon is asked because the US is already supplying anti-aircraft Stinger missiles to the Afghans. However, it does not reply to Salem, and the reason for the failure to reply is not known. According to a business partner involved in Salem’s efforts to secure the missiles, he makes several attempts to contact the Pentagon, but is unable to locate the right person in the defense bureaucracy. Later research will indicate that there is no formal decision by the Reagan administration not to supply the missiles or other equipment to the Arab volunteers. Pentagon official Michael Pillsbury will later say he was not aware of any such decision, but if such a decision had been taken, he would have been aware of it. [COLL, 2008, PP. 287]
Entity Tags: Michael Pillsbury, Salem bin Laden, US Department of Defense
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

Entity Tags: Special Air Service
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin


Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office,Michael Springmann
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, Other Islamist Radical Groups, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Near the end of the Soviet-Afghan war in the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, the radical mujaheddin heavily funded by the CIA and Saudi Arabia kill moderate Afghans by the thousands. By doing so, they manage to eliminate rivals to power when the war is over. The US does not object or limit funding because of this. Cheryl Benard, a RAND Corporation expert on Islam and the wife of future US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, will later comment: “At first, everyone thought, There’s no way to beat the Soviets. So what we have to do is throw the worst crazies at them that we can find, and there was a lot of collateral damage. We knew exactly who these people were, and what their organizations were like, and we didn’t care. Then, we allowed them to get rid of, just kill all the moderate leaders. The reason we don’t have moderate leaders in Afghanistan today is because we let the nuts kill them all. They killed the leftists, the moderates, the middle-of-the-roaders. They were just eliminated, during the 1980s and afterward.” [DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 291]
Entity Tags: Cheryl Benard
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Ali Mohamed, now an instructor at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (see 1986), travels to Afghanistan to train mujaheddin. He tells friends that he plans to join the mujaheddin in Afghanistan and “kill Russians.” He informs supervisor Lt. Col. Steve Neely of his plans, who passes the information up the chain of command. Lt. Col. Robert Anderson, Mohamed’s commanding officer, also reports Mohamed’s suspicious activities to Fort Bragg officials and army intelligence, but gets no response. Mohamed takes one month of leave and goes to Afghanistan. No action is taken to prevent him from doing this. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/1/1998; RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, 10/21/2001;MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 143] When he returns, he boasts of his combat exploits to his colleagues. Lt. Col. Anderson writes up a second report and again gets no response. Freelance fighting would be a serious breach of military rules, and the New York Times will later note that, “The capture or death of an American serviceman in Afghanistan would have been a major international embarrassment to the United States.” However, no disciplinary action is taken against him. This leads Anderson to conclude that Mohamed’s activities are sponsored by a US intelligence agency. Anderson will state, “I think you or I would have a better chance of winning [the lottery], than an Egyptian major in the unit that assassinated [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat would have getting a visa, getting to California… getting into the Army and getting assigned to a Special Forces unit. That just doesn’t happen.” He will add that it is equally unthinkable that an ordinary US soldier would go unpunished after fighting in a foreign war. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/1/1998; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 11/4/2001] Mohamed is also stealing classified documents from the base; some of them will be discovered by US investigators in 1990 (see November 5, 1990). According to a US army spokesperson, an officer working with Mohammed “did have some suspicions about what he did, but nothing came as a result of it. It really depended on who you believed.”[ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/31/2001]
Entity Tags: Steve Neely, Ali Mohamed, Robert Anderson
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin

Former Ambassador: Congress 'Acquiesced' to Pakistani Program - According to the New Yorker, “many former members of the Reagan and Bush Administrations,” such as former ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, will say that the essential facts about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program were known fully at this time to Congress, whose members “acquiesced” to the program, because of the Soviet-Afghan War and the popularity of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in the US. Journalist Seymour Hersh will later comment, “Oakley’s point seemed to be that passive approval by Congress of bad policy somehow justified bad policy.”
Glenn: Nonproliferation Initiatives Thwarted - Senator John Glenn (D-OH) will say that most lawmakers did not want to know anyway: “I always thought in terms of the bigger picture—the nonproliferation treaty… We made a commitment that we’d cut off aid to transgressors, and we had to keep faith with those Third World people who signed with us. I didn’t think I had any option but to press for enforcement of the law against Pakistan.” He adds: “The Administration would always come to me and say how important it is to keep the arms flowing through to Afghanistan. I’d take my case on nonproliferation to the floor and lose the vote.”
Solarz: Balancing Concerns between Pakistan, Afghan War - Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), one of the strongest opponents of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program during the Soviet-Afghan War, will admit that he and others who cared about non-proliferation constantly tried to balance that concern with a desire to support the anti-Soviet effort, which was based in Pakistan. “There were legitimate concerns that the Afghan war might spill over to Pakistan, and I felt we needed to give the President flexibility,” Solarz will say. “I didn’t want us to be in a worst-case scenario in case the Soviets moved across the border. I thought I was being responsible at the time.” Referring to allegations made by former State Department, CIA, and Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow that the administration was well-aware of the program and constantly lied to Congress (see July 1987 or Shortly After), he adds, “If what Barlow says is true, this would have been a major scandal of Iran-Contra proportions, and the officials involved would have had to resign. We’re not dealing with minor matters. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the major foreign-policy issues of the nation—not to mention the law of the land.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993]
Entity Tags: Seymour Hersh, Richard Barlow, Robert Oakley, Pakistan
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
The US government sends 25 high-powered sniper rifles to a group of fighters in Afghanistan that includes bin Laden. The armor-piercing weapons have range-finding equipment and night-vision scopes. In an early 2001 US court trial, Essam al Ridi, a pilot for bin Laden in the early 1990s (see Early 1993), will recall that he helped ship the weapons to Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor. Azzam and bin Laden are close to each other at this time, and al Ridi will later testify he sometimes saw the two of them together. The president of the US company that made the rifles will later state that the rifles “were picked up by US government trucks, shipped to US government bases, and shipped to those Afghan freedom fighters.” The rifles are considered ideal for assassination. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/16/2001] The order, worth about $150,000 at the time, is a significant one for the manufacturer, accounting for 15-25% of its annual turnover on the guns. Their export would usually require an end user certificate from the US Department of State, but the circumstances of the sale are unknown, as al Ridi is not asked how he manages to purchase such a large number of rifles. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/7/2001;SUNDAY TRIBUNE, 10/15/2001] The CIA will deny being involved in the transfer. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 3/7/2002] However, al Ridi will say that the CIA was aware that bin Laden ended up with some of the guns. [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/3/2002] This shipment is especially significant because there was a protracted debate within the Reagan administration about sending sniper rifles to Afghanistan due to worries that it could violate a US law against assassinations and put US officials in legal jeopardy. In the end, the US gave less than 100 of such rifles without night-vision scopes to the government of Pakistan to pass on to mujaheddin, but the ones sent to Azzam had night-vision scopes. The timing is also significant since the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and complete the pull out in February 1989, around when these rifles are sent. The rifles given to Pakistan appear to have arrived before 1987. [WASHINGTON POST, 7/20/1992]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, United States, Abdullah Azzam, Essam al Ridi
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Although the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1989 (see February 15, 1989), the CIA continues to support the mujaheddin because the Soviet-allied Communist government stays in power in Kabul. Apparently, the CIA and the Saudi government continue to fund the mujaheddin at least until December 1990, although it could be longer because the Communist government remains in power in Kabul until 1992. The “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, reportedly has been working with the CIA in the 1980s to help unite the mujaheddin factions fighting each other (see Late 1980s). The Village Voice will later report that according to a “very high-ranking Egyptian official,” Abdul-Rahman continues to work with the CIA after moving to Brooklyn in July 1990 (see July 1990). He “work[s] closely with the CIA, helping to channel a steady flow of money, men, and guns to mujaheddin bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” But despite working with the CIA, Abdul-Rahman still considers the US the “Great Satan” and does not try to hide this. In one radio broadcast, he says that “Americans are descendants of apes and pigs who have been feeding from the dining tables of the Zionists, Communism, and colonialism.” Matti Steinberg, an expert on Islamic fundamentalism, says that Abdul-Rahman’s “long-term goal is to weaken US society and to show Arab rulers that the US is not an invulnerable superpower.” The Egyptian official will later complain, “We begged America not to coddle the sheikh.” [VILLAGE VOICE, 3/30/1993]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Matti Steinberg
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
In an interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Adviser, admits that it was US policy to support radical Islamists to undermine Russia. He admits that US covert action drew Russia into starting the Afghan war in 1979 (seeJuly 3, 1979). Asked if he has regrets about this, he responds, “Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war.” Then he is asked if he regrets “having given arms and advice to future terrorists,” and he responds, “What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?” The interviewer then says, “Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.” But Brzezinski responds, “Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam….” [LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (PARIS), 1/15/1998] Even after 9/11, Brzezinski will maintain that the covert action program remains justified. [NATION, 10/25/2001]
Entity Tags: Zbigniew Brzezinski
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin
Afghan Defense Minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, tells the Council on Foreign Relations in an interview that Washington’s commitment to equipping and expanding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) falls short of expectations. “It was a big surprise” when the president made his announcement, he remarks. Wardak says that President Obama’s announced plan to raise 134,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 82,000 National Police by 2011 (see March 27, 2009) is not an overall increase in numbers or pacing, explaining that those targets had been planned for months. Wardak says he was expecting a much more rapid increase of combined forces to between 400,000 and 450,000 in number. Similar numbers were floated by US military and NATO sources in earlier reports (seeMarch 18, 2009, April 2, 2009, and March 24, 2009). Furthermore, Gen. Wardak says he has repeatedly asked the US and NATO for help in getting more and better equipment, but to no avail. “At the moment we are still lighter than light infantry,” Wardak says. “I was much [better] equipped when we were fighting the Soviets” in the 1980s. [COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS / CFR.ORG, 4/16/2009]
Entity Tags: Council on Foreign Relations, Abdul Rahim Wardak, Afghan National Police,Afghan National Army, Obama administration, Afghan National Security Forces
Category Tags: US Aid to Islamist Mujaheddin, US Invasion, Occupation
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